Satya and mithyā are therefore two ontological terms, terms that express 'being'. How can I look at reality on an essential level. Both define one reality on a different level, as two different orders of reality. There is only one being, but with satya (absolute) and mithyā (relative) we can express why a world appears in (conscious) being.

All objects (visible or invisible phenomena) as limited things, feelings or thoughts, are mithyā. They are not isolated. In order to exist, they have to depend on something, that which is aware of them. No consciousness, no object. Furthermore, all objects have a beginning and an end. This makes them changeable, in constant flux, which expresses their impermanence. An object has an infinitely short span. An object can never stand alone. Think of an eroding rock, a body that has constant cell renewal, etc. Everything that is changeable is mithyā.

Vedānta defines as real, that which is always (satya, existence-consciousness) and as unreal that which has a beginning and an end (mithyā).

Satya is the substrate consciousness, which is free to stand on its own, is infinitely present, has no beginning and end and is unchanging. Consciousness is the only thing that really exists. There had to be a principle for the Big Bang to take place, there had to be a principle here and now to be aware of objects. Satya is existence itself. Mithyā is an expression or apparent manifestation of satya and thus dependent on satya. Satya is unchangeable, mithyā is everything that is apparently changeable in it. Satya is imperishable, while the objects that we call mithyā as separate things always decay, expire, evaporate.

Mithyā is defined in two ways: adhiṣṭhāna ananya, that which has being as its basis (adhiṣṭhāna) something else (ananya). This something else (which in reality is not something else of course, but the substrate, the in-ground of the objects) is satya, existence, consciousness. This means again that a separate object does not have an independent existence.

Second definition: sad asadbhyām anirvacanīya, that which cannot be expressed in words, even if we try. Sometimes something seems to be this or that, but we can also look at it differently. In this way, all objects turn out to be concepts. When I see a sweater, I can also see threads or knitting patterns. When I see threads, I can also see wool etc. A physicist sees nanoparticles or strings in it, and if she or he has just studied a new groundbreaking theory, he sees the observation in the light of those new concepts. That even in science everything is falsified is typical of what the concept of mithyā expresses. Things never turn out to be exactly what we thought they were.

The fact that mithyā cannot be expressed precisely brings us to the following definition: Mithyā is that which is not absolutely existent, but also not non-existent (sad asadbhyām). In this way we already feel the elusiveness of mithyā.

And rightly so, because mithyā turns out to be just satya, but satya is free from mithyā. This is how non-duality is described with words at best. But this being versus non-being relationship remains a curious, absurd (sad asad vilakṣaṇa) relationship. That is why mithyā is generally translated as false. By this we mean: The appearances of reality do not have an existence of their own, but a borrowed existence of consciousness. They are not the object that the senses (including mithyā) conjure up for us, but they are an expression of satya, consciousness.

The following analysis confirms and clarifies this, and makes the difficult philosophical concepts practical: A table can also be seen as wood, fibers, molecules, atoms, quarks, concepts, information, knowledge, intelligence, consciousness. We can apply this to any material object. Whoever understands the satya mithyā relationship understands the reality of himself: Not a person, but consciousness. With every thought, there is a neutral principle that lights it up. Consciousness is always the case, and expresses itself in objects that come and go.

Mithyā is an ontological term (term of being) that indicates what is neither absolutely real nor unreal, but what is empirical, objective, relative, and dependently real. Thus, three characteristics are mentioned: What mithyā is, has a beginning and an end (is impermanent), is dependent on something else (its substrate consciousness) and is subject to change. Therefore, everything that can be experienced can be classified as mithyā. Any experience as a separate fact is mithyā, because it is actually satya.

Mithyā is a way of expressing asat. Something that depends for its existence on its observer or on its substrate sat, just as a perception (a perceived object) depends on its observer, or a piece of gold jewelry depends on its substrate, gold. The perception and ornament are only known if the observer and the gold are present. Remove them and the perceived object and ornament disappear. Consciousness cannot disappear, it is existence itself.

Therefore, the knower and perception in the mind, and the ornament in the world, are both mithyā, depending on reality, not absolutely real, but certainly not illusions or delusions. The form itself is an illusion, adhyāsa. An illusion does exist, but it means that it is not what it seems. It's not what I think it is. And non-existence does not exist, so it is useless to talk like that. At this point, it is good to introduce a third order of reality, in addition to satya and mithyā, namely tuccha: Objects that are not even real in relative reality. Like the horns of a hare, or Middle-earth civilizations etc. These are even in the world of objects fantasies, no more than thoughts.

It is the same truth: All objects are simply existence-consciousness itself.

The perceived object is simply existence-consciousness itself. In this way we can see the threatening world, as the ocean of consciousness that I am, in which there are some silly movements (mental and physical waves). The jñānī does not experience mithyā, only satya. The experience is the bliss of wholeness, fullness and wholeness. A thing, therefore, has no existence of itself, but borrows its existence from existence itself.

If we express this in language, it turns out that we have to reverse the syntax rules. A table does not exist (as itself), but existence table (appears temporarily as a table). Hence the term vilakṣaṇa (strange, absurd, curious, funny) for mithyā.

An appearance in consciousness can thus be seen as (an expression of) consciousness itself. Mithyā is a synonym of mṛṣā, unreal, false, and vaitathyam (term used by Gauḍapāda, the guru-grandfather of Śaṅkara, in his Māṇḍūkya Kārikā), falsehood.

In the end, it is essential to realize that mithyā in his deeper reality is satya. It is a non-dual relationship, and therefore not a relationship. "Where there is mithyā, there is satya," in the words of André Vas. There is only satya, even though mithyā appears.

In addition to the main qualifications of dependence (tantra), variability (pariṇama) and impermanence (anitya) of the ontological category of mithyā, we mention the following qualifications that you may sometimes encounter in the literature:

1. sattva anupalabdhi
It is not in itself absolutely real (sat). It has no svarūpa sattā (essential, absolute existence) as a separate object.

2. asattva anupalabdhi
Nor is it absolutely unreal (asat), like a hare's horn (śaśaviṣāṇa), which does not even appear. Mithyā does appear! Conclusion: It is not sat, not asat, so: sad asat vilakṣaṇa.

3. adhiṣṭhāna ananyatva
It is non-different from its carrier (substrate). Just as the illusion of silver is not separate from the shell, mithyā is inseparable from Brahman, its base/substrate (adhiṣṭhāna).

4. vyavahārika sattā
It has practical validity in the world. Within the 'happening' of daily experience (vyavahāra) it functions correctly as īśvara and has a full right to exist. An illusory snake does scare you. Therefore, it is not pure nothing.

5. jñāna nivartyatva
It is lifted by right knowledge. Just as the serpent disappears when you see that it is a rope, so mithyā disappears with the right insight into Brahman.

6. anirvacanīyatva
It is not definitively describable as sat or asat, anirvacanīyā mithyā, it is ineffable in terms of being or non-being.